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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

A shortage of suitable franchisees has long plagued the Australian
franchise industry impacting franchisors’ capacity to grow their chains.
This exploratory research identiﬁes, deﬁnes and examines an unresearched category of franchisees that of internally recruited franchisees, who prior to their franchise recruitment were employees of the
franchisor. This category has previously been ignored by the literature
even though estimates of some chains place the proportion of internally recruited franchisees at over 40 per cent. Employing qualitative
interviews with key franchisor decision makers this research begins to
address this gap. This study investigates what factors drive franchisors
to recruit franchisees from the ranks of their employees and how they
perceive this impacts on the achievement of franchising’s four strategic
imperatives of unit growth, system uniformity, local responsiveness
and system-wide adaption. Seven drivers for the internal recruiting of
franchisees were identiﬁed: company owned units, signiﬁcant system
hierarchy, larger unit scale, unit viability, system maturity, capital freedom and strong growth in unit numbers. A preliminary model of
factors inﬂuencing the propensity of franchise systems to recruit franchisees internally is presented. This research provides the ﬁrst contribution to the franchise literature on the internally recruited franchisee
phenomenon. In a practical sense this study should inﬂuence the
recruitment practices of franchisors.
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1. Introduction
Worldwide, franchising representing the fastest growing form of retailing (Hizam-Hanaﬁah
& Li, 2014) accounting for 32 per cent of retail sales in Germany, 40 per cent in the USA and
52 per cent in Australia (Dant, Grunhagen, & Windsperger, 2011). In Australia, franchising
constitutes a signiﬁcant and growing sector of the economy with franchised units having
increased from 43,800 in 1999 to 79,000 in 2016, directly employing almost 500,00 people
(Frazer, Weaven, Grace, & Selvanathan, 2016). Nevertheless, this growth is now under threat
with some major Australian franchise groups experiencing more than a 50 per cent reduction in franchise enquiries in 2017–18 (Bailey, 2018). While some of this reduction is
undoubtedly due to negative publicity surrounding the 2018 Australian Senate inquiry
into the Franchising Code of Conduct (Inside Franchise Business, 2018), a lack of suitable
franchisees has long been a key constraint facing franchisors in their quest for growth
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(Bradach, 1997). Even prior to this recent reduction, a national survey found over 70 per cent
of franchisors rated a lack of suitable franchisees as their major ongoing challenge (Frazer,
Weaven, & Grace, 2014). It has been an enduring industry problem, with an earlier survey
ﬁnding that almost half of Australian franchisors believed the availability of prospective
franchisees was insuﬃcient to meet their growth needs (Frazer, Weaven, & Bodey, 2012).
Indeed, the recent trend towards part-time franchising in some sectors may be in reaction to
the diﬃculty in ﬁnding full-time potential franchisees (Thaichon, Weaven, Quach, Baker, &
Frazer, 2019). Arguably this franchisee shortage has also been exacerbated by a lack of
female participation in franchising (Thaichon et al., 2018).
One reaction by franchisors to a shortage of suitable new franchisees has simply been
to grant more franchises to existing franchisees. Known as multiple unit franchising, this
expansionary strategy has been extensively researched (Bradach, 1995; Garg, Priem, &
Rasheed, 2013; Hussain, Sreckovic, & Windsperger, 2018; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Weaven
& Frazer, 2007). However, another potential reaction is to recruit franchisees internally
from the ranks of the franchisors’ own employees. Recently this has been indicated as
a possible solution by numerous franchising trade publications. Articles with titles such as
On the hunt for a franchisee? Take a look at your own employees (Syed & Syed, 2019); Four
Reasons Why Former Employees Make the Best Franchisees (Bisio, 2015); Crossing over: why
employees make great franchisees (Russell, 2014) and From head oﬃce employee to franchisee (Camplin, 2013) have emerged in trade publications citing the internal recruiting of
franchisees as a viable solution to the franchisee shortage.
Despite the prevalence of recruiting internally in franchise industry articles and its apparent
widespread practice, the literature on internally recruited franchisees remains scant, with no
academic studies examining internally recruited franchisees. The current research contributes
to ﬁlling this gap by identifying, deﬁning and exploring the emerging, yet under researched
category of internally recruited franchisees. It presents valuable insight into the opportunities
that internally recruited franchisees can provide to help alleviate the franchisee shortage
prevalent in todays’ marketplace, and thereby facilitate growth that may otherwise be stymied.
The current study contributes to the existing franchise literature that has been totally predicated on externally recruited franchisees, by speciﬁcally initiating research into the franchisee category of internally recruited franchisees. Accordingly, this research addresses two
research questions:
RQ1. What factors drive franchisors to recruit franchisees from the ranks of their employees?
RQ2. What impact do franchisors perceive that the internal recruiting of franchisees will
have on franchise systems achieving the four franchising strategic imperatives of unit
growth, system uniformity, local responsiveness and system-wide adaption?

2. Literature review
2.1 Franchising formats
Business format franchising, as the preeminent form of franchising (Storholm & Scheuing,
1994) is the focus of this research. It involves the franchisor’s provision of a complete
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business system including brand-name, training, marketing and site selection (Bender,
2015). Generally, it entails the franchisee agreeing to conform to the franchisor’s standards and paying a franchise fee with an ongoing royalty, which is often a percentage of
sales (Croonen, Brand, & Huizingh, 2016).

2.2 Main theories for franchising research
Traditionally, franchising research has focused on the three theories of resource scarcity,
agency theory and plural form symbiosis (Combs, Ketchen, & Short, 2011; Gillis &
Castrogiovanni, 2012). Resource scarcity has its nexus in the causal connection between
resources and competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011).
It suggests a major reason for franchisors franchising is franchising provides access to
franchisees’ capital, as well as their managerial, entrepreneurial and local knowledge
(Caves & Murphy, 1976; Combs, Michael, & Castrogiovanni, 2009; Ketchen, Ireland, &
Snow, 2007; Norton, 1988a; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969; Perryman & Combs, 2012).
Agency theory contends that company employed managers may supply less than their
best eﬀorts [shirking] and choose actions that lead to lower wealth for the principals
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Alon, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lafontaine, 1992). Franchising
circumvents this outcome by giving franchisees residual claims to their store’s proﬁts,
thereby encouraging franchisees to work harder and reducing the monitoring costs of the
franchisor (Bradach, 1997; Norton, 1988a; Perryman & Combs, 2012; Rubin, 1978).
Bradach and Eccles (1989) coined the term ‘plural form symbiosis’ to describe the franchising phenomena where franchisors maintain some company-owned outlets but also franchise
outlets. Later studies conﬁrmed the symbiotic advantages conferred on a franchise system that
maintained both forms (i.e. company owned outlets and franchise outlets), with franchisees
deemed to foster the entrepreneurial characteristics of innovation and local market adaption,
while company-owned outlets promote standardization (Combs et al., 2011; Darr, Argote, &
Epple, 1995; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999; Meiseberg, 2013; Perrigot & Herrbach, 2012).

2.3 Categories of franchisees
Prototypically a franchisee has been characterised as an individual external to the organisation
who is prepared to apply their accumulated ﬁnancial, entrepreneurial, and managerial capital
to owning and running a single franchise outlet (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). Therefore, for many
years the generally accepted view of a franchise system was that it comprised a franchisor and
a conglomeration of single unit franchisees. From the early 1990 s researchers began to focus
on the growing phenomenon of multiple unit franchisees. Speciﬁcally, this involved instances
where multiple franchise units in the same chain are owned by the same franchisee. This has
subsequently been acknowledged as a common form of expansion for many franchise
systems (Garg et al., 2013; Hussain et al., 2018) with multiple unit franchisees also controlling
a signiﬁcant percentage of franchise units (Weaven & Frazer, 2007).

2.4 Externally recruited franchisees v internally recruited franchisees
In stark contrast to the attention paid to multiple unit franchising over the past 25 years,
no studies were found which focused on the distinctions between two other categories of
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franchisees, that of externally recruited franchisees (ERFs) and internally recruited franchisees (IRFs). ERFs represent the more conventional view of a franchisee involving the
traditional approach of recruiting franchisees externally with the franchisee oﬀering their
capital, entrepreneurial spirit, and business knowledge often from diverse ﬁelds (Norton,
1988b). Indeed, the entire concept of franchising is based on a franchisee being an
independent businessperson who lacks the requisite expertise within the new ﬁeld of
endeavor, but obtains that expertise through the dyadic experience of acquiring
a franchise from a franchisor, hence the description ‘being in business for yourself but
not by yourself’ (Kaufmann, 1999, p. 345). The franchisor ﬁnds this business relationship
attractive, as they gain an injection of capital without requiring the issuing of shares or
borrowing of funds, they also gain the entrepreneurial oversight of someone who has skin
in the game (Frazer & Roussety, 2017). Agency theory suggests that because the franchisee
shares in the unit’s growth upside, in both a proﬁt and capital sense the franchisee has far
more incentive than employee management to improve results (Rubin, 1978).
In this research an internally recruited franchisee is deﬁned as a franchisee who, prior to
their franchise recruitment, was an employee of the franchisor or an employee of one of
its franchisees. Most often, IRFs were previously employed within the operations side of
the franchisor’s business as unit managers or above, and thus ‘were proven operators’
(Bradach, 1997, p. 292) who had displayed operational aptitude over a prolonged period.
Indeed, in his 1977 biography McDonald’s founder Ray Kroc acknowledged that in
franchisee selection McDonald’s gave preference to long serving employees (Kroc &
Anderson, 1977). This ‘long preexisting relationship’ (Bradach, 1997, p. 292) added to
the level of trust between the franchisor and the IRF. In a similar way to multiple unit
franchisees, IRFs’ operational knowledge circumvents the need for the standard training
period, which means the gestation period for an IRF from initial recruitment to being
active within an outlet is signiﬁcantly less than an ERF (Lashley & Morrison, 2000). Due to
their required years of franchisor employee service, logically this leaves IRFs with less
opportunity for broad business experience from other industries when compared with
ERFs. IRFs also often possess less ﬁnancial capital than their ERF counterparts with Bradach
observing ‘while company people rarely had the required capital, the chain . . . often
assisted them in buying the franchise’ (1997, p. 292).
While IRFs have been acknowledged frequently in recent trade publications (Bisio,
2015; Camplin, 2013; Russell, 2014; Syed & Syed, 2019), the category of IRFs has received
little research attention in the academic literature. Indeed, Lashley and Morrison’s (2000)
book is primarily about franchising hospitality services and devotes just two of its 274
pages to sourcing franchisees from company employees. While Bradach’s (1997) study
assigns just four of its 76 paragraphs to the same topic. Though dated, both these works
place the prevalence of IRFs in major chains such as Jack-in-a-Box and McDonald’s at
above 40 per cent (Bradach, 1997; Lashley & Morrison, 2000). Remarkably, despite this
reported prevalence no prior research has focused on IRFs.

2.5 The four franchising strategic imperatives as a conceptual framework
The ﬁrst research question is almost completely inductive and consequently imposes no
existing conceptual framework. The second research question uses an accepted conceptual framework from the franchising literature of franchising’s four strategic imperatives
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as the lens through which to conduct the exploration (Creswell, 2014). Bradach’s pioneering (1995) study on multiple unit franchising identiﬁed four key factors for system success
known as the four franchising strategic imperatives. Speciﬁcally they include unit growth,
system uniformity, local responsiveness and system-wide adaption. These imperatives
have subsequently provided the conceptual framework for numerous franchising studies,
including Boulay, Caemmerer, Evanschitzky and Duniach’s (2016) recent investigation into
the links between multiple unit franchising and the attainment of the four franchising
strategic imperatives. The four strategic imperatives have also been used to explain why
franchisors choose between the various governance models of franchising (Bodey,
Weaven, & Grace, 2011, 2013). Two separate studies, Cliquet and Penard (2012) and
Meiseberg (2013) found that plural forms generally enhanced a franchise systems chance
of attaining the imperatives. Given these four franchising strategic imperatives are utilised
as the conceptual framework in this research to address the second research question,
a description of each imperative is now presented.
For franchisors, unit growth (growth in the number of units) is an imperative as it
facilitates economies of scale through bulk purchasing, as well as the diﬀusion of marketing and administrative costs over a greater number of individual outlets (Garg, Rasheed, &
Priem, 2005). As most franchise chains operate as a plural form, with both companyowned and franchised outlets, unit growth can develop from three sources: (1) adding
a company-owned outlet, (2) granting a new outlet to an existing franchisee, or (3) adding
a new franchisee and a new outlet (Bradach, 1995; Garg et al., 2005; Meiseberg, 2013). If
the latter source is selected a further decision is required, whether to recruit an IRF or an
ERF as the new franchisee for the new outlet.
The second imperative of system uniformity refers to the franchise system having standardised methods of operation that have little variation from unit to unit (Bodey et al., 2013).
As many franchise systems are founded on brand name capital, consistency becomes very
important for the sustainability of the franchise chain (Bodey et al., 2011; Nelson, Loken, &
Bennett, 2009). A sustainable competitive advantage can be signiﬁcantly eroded if a lack of
uniformity leads to the dilution and weakening of the brand (Boulay et al., 2016).
The third imperative of local responsiveness signiﬁes the need to be ﬂexible enough to
understand customer needs and adapt to heterogeneous markets. The successful spread
of franchise chains has meant individual units may compete in diverse local markets
(Bradach, 1995). Generally, franchisees have been considered more responsive to local
needs than managers of company-owned units, with franchisees’ local market knowledge
forming a critical part of a chain’s resources (Boulay et al., 2016). This knowledge, coupled
with franchisees’ strong unit proﬁt motivation (Rubin, 1978), provides the springboard for
a competitive advantage at the local level (Minkler, 1992).
Bradach (1995, p. 78) suggested system-wide adaption involved four components: ‘(1)
generating new ideas, (2) testing and evaluating ideas, (3) deciding which to pursue, and
(4) implementing them’. To be successful franchise systems need to implement a strategic
marketing management process, whereby adaption involves responses to changes in
marketing, competitive environments, and customer tastes (Bodey et al., 2011). Inherent
here, is the notion these adaptions are appropriate system-wide, hence this imperative
has some association with the concept of system uniformity discussed earlier (Bodey et al.,
2011). While some adaptions to the system are inspired by the franchisor, there are
numerous examples where franchisees’ new ideas and innovations have proven crucial
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for success in franchise systems (Dada, Watson, & Kirby, 2015; Meiseberg, 2013; Watson,
Dada, Grünhagen, & Wollan, 2016). Such co-created value meets the criteria for entrepreneurial marketing (Whalen et al., 2016) thereby fostering an opportunity for a competitive
advantage.

3. Research methodology
Given the scarcity of literature on IRFs as a franchisee recruitment option, a qualitative
methodology was employed for this exploratory study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Saunders, Lewis,
& Thornhill, 2009). Aaker, Kumar, and Day (1997) describe exploratory studies as ‘research
that usually is designed to generate ideas where the hypotheses are vague or ill-deﬁned’
(p. 759). Qualitative research is appropriate when the focus is on gaining an in-depth
understanding to facilitate the development of ‘interpretations of phenomena of interest
without numerical measurement’ (Zikmund, Ward, Lowe, Winzar, & Babin, 2011, p. 65). For
the ﬁrst research question given no previous academic inquiry had been made into the
drivers behind the internal recruiting of franchisees, an inductive approach was employed
(Creswell, 2014). The aim was to allow the data gathered to identify and develop the
theory (Corbin, 2017). Respondents were simply asked ‘Why franchisors may decide to
recruit franchisees from the ranks of their employees’. For research question two, the
theoretical lens (Creswell, 2014) of the four strategic franchising imperatives was used
to explore the perceived impact of IRFs on franchise systems. While this lens shaped the
questions asked (Creswell, 2014), the approach remained inductive with no propositions
developed in advance as to what the ultimate impacts could be. Semi-structured interviews were conducted one-to-one to gain rich insights into the research questions
(Saunders et al., 2009). At the commencement of the interview, demographic and career
history data was captured which was later triangulated with more comprehensive information from the participants’ LinkedIn proﬁles and franchisor websites. A list of topics was
then explored relating to the research questions and the participants’ experiences in
making franchisee recruitment decisions. The process was adaptive, with the researchers
ﬁne tuning and adjusting between interviews (Dick, 2016). The interviews were recorded
and lasted a duration of up to one hour.
Thematic analysis is principally concerned with identifying, organizing, and interpreting themes in textual data. It is now ubiquitous in qualitative organisational research (King
& Brooks, 2018), and used in recent franchising research (Grace, Frazer, Weaven, & Dant,
2016). Accordingly, the six phases of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) were
employed for this study: data familiarisation, coding, generating initial themes, reviewing
themes, theme deﬁnition and naming, writing results. Familiarization began during
transcription, as this was undertaken by the researchers rather than being outsourced
(Frazer, 2004). Further, familiarisation occurred via the transcripts being initially examined
with notes of ﬁrst impressions made. Transcripts were then read and re-read in detail,
further immersing the researchers in the data. Initial coding then followed, with the
labeling of information deemed relevant to the ﬁrst research question. These codes
were then scrutinized to identify broader patterns and organized into potential themes
(Attride-Stirling, 2001). The more grounded approach to research question one meant
these themes were generated without reference to theory. For added rigour, the data was
also analyzed using Leximancer V4.51 (Wilk, Soutar, & Harrigan, 2019) with no additional
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meaningful themes emerging. All candidate themes were then discussed and reviewed
until intercoder agreement (MacPhail, Khoza, Abler, & Ranganathan, 2016) was achieved
as to their pertinence to the ﬁrst research question (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Signiﬁcant
themes were deﬁned and named, with their relationships to research question one
conceptualized and developed [see Figure 1]. Direct quotes were used in the writing up
of the results to provide raw data that encapsulates participants’ views (Labuschagne,
2003). A similar sequence was followed for the second research question however, codes
were ﬁrst generated relative to the theoretical framework of the four strategic franchising
imperatives, and then organized into themes under each imperative.

3.1 Sampling
Purposive sampling involves ‘selecting units . . . based on speciﬁc purposes associated
with answering a research study’s questions’ (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, p. 77). In order to
explore the major reasons for the internal recruiting of franchisees, it was critical decision
makers responsible for or exposed to the strategic reasoning for such recruitment
practices within franchise chains, were recruited for the in-depth interviews. Since the
entry of the major US fast food chains into Australian in the late 1960 s (Schaper & Buchan,
2014), the fast food industry has been synonymous with franchising (Grünhagen &
Mittelstaedt, 2005) and is estimated to encompass almost A$20 billion per annum in
sales (Vuong, 2017). Thus, a purposive sample of current and former Australian fast food
franchisor executives whose roles had been integrally involved in their organizations’
franchising policy, decisions and outcomes was obtained. To achieve this, snowball
sampling was utilized and recruiting occurred until suﬃcient saturation was achieved

Figure 1. Preliminary model of factors inﬂuencing system propensity to recruit franchisees internally.
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(Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Ultimately, interviews were conducted with nine franchise executives. As endorsed by previous qualitative franchising research (Kaufmann,
1999; Weaven, Isaac, & Herington, 2007) a cross-sectional perspective across levels of
management was sought. Three participants falling into the Top-level [Managing
Director], three falling into the Mid-level [Regional/State Manager] and three falling into
the Lower-level [Operations Manager, Franchise Coordinator]. Validity was enhanced by
way of six of these executives having exposure to more than one franchise chain, and all
having exposure to at least one franchise chain where internal recruiting of franchisees
had occurred. Indeed, nearly half (four) provided somewhat unique perspectives as they
had gone on to become internally recruited franchisees themselves, after their corporate
careers. A total of 224 years’ experience in the ﬁeld of franchising was tapped in to
(ranging from six to 38 years) with the sample, the average being 25.6 years.
Characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1.

4. Results
4.1 Drivers for internal recruiting of franchisees
In relation to the ﬁrst research question exploring the drivers for a franchisor to recruit
franchisees internally, the results revealed several factors were evident in raising the
overall propensity of a franchise system to recruit internally. These factors are presented
in Figure 1 and are expanded upon below with references made to existing literature.

4.1.1. Company owned units
Bradach (1997, p. 291–292) observed ‘a key constraint facing chains as they sought to grow
was ﬁnding interested and qualiﬁed franchisees. The plural form oﬀered a means of escaping
this constraint by utilizing company people as franchisees’. Consequently, systems that do not
have company-owned stores have a greatly reduced potential to recruit internally. The
prototypical IRF has already run an outlet giving them the critical operations knowledge
required to be a franchisee. Indeed, respondent FE4 commented that almost all IRFs ‘have
been trained in operations or been a . . . unit manager’. Thus, by having a proportion of
Table 1. Australian fast food executive characteristics.
Executive
Level
Top
Top
Top
Mid
Mid
Mid
Lower

Franchise
Executive
FE1
FE2
FE3
FE4
FE5
FE6
FE7

Lower

FE8

Lower

FE9

Highest position in Highest units
a franchise chain responsible for
Managing Director
700+
Managing Director
250+
Managing Director
NA*
Regional Manager
100+
Regional Manager
50+
Managing Director#
40+
Operations
15+
Manager
Franchise
15+
Coordinator
Franchise
15+
Coordinator

* consults to many chains
# chain operates in one state only

Number of
chains involved
with
2
2
10+
1
3
2
2

Subsequently
became a franchisee
Years in
(IRF)
franchising
No
27
No
34
No
19
Yes
33
No
10
No
6
Yes
38

1

Yes

35

1

Yes

28
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company-owned stores franchise chains have a fertile source from which to recruit internal
candidates. The deﬁnition of IRF also encompasses employees of franchisees. Recent research
has found employees of franchisees may be positively inﬂuenced by support provided by the
franchisor (Ramaseshan, Rabbanee, & Burford, 2018). However, this avenue for recruitment
may be limited by lack of support from franchisees. FE3 noting that where a franchisor is
actively seeking IRFs ‘some franchisees don’t like to communicate that to their staﬀ because
they feel they are going to lose their staﬀ . . . and have to recruit again’.

4.1.2. Signiﬁcant system hierarchy
Systems that have a signiﬁcant system hierarchy possess a greater opportunity to recruit
internally. Larger systems require a much greater head oﬃce infrastructure facilitating a career
path for employees beyond the store level. This point and the ﬁrst point on the extent of
company owned units are interrelated. Chains that operate company-owned stores require
more signiﬁcant system hierarchies to provide greater oversight of these units, with up to 10
times more monitoring costs being spent on the company-owned outlets versus outlets that
are franchised (Bradach, 1997; Perryman & Combs, 2012). Commenting on a large system that
had over 250 Australian stores, FE2 stated that IRFs represented ‘at least half’ of the franchisee
cohort and comprised mainly of former ‘store managers or corporate head oﬃce persons’. In
contrast, when asked about the extent of internal recruiting in their chain of just over 40 stores
with a very lean corporate staﬃng structure, FE6 stated ‘as we are all franchised . . . there is little
of that happening and because of our scale we do not have a lot of progression’.
Organisations with a larger system hierarchy also often encounter the need to manage,
motivate and turnover that hierarchy. In today’s litigious world, this can pose diﬃculties
with Australian unfair dismissal legislation applying to employees earning below A$148,700
annually (Fair Work Commission, 2019). FE7 had experience with a large chain that sometimes resolved such issues by oﬀering the outgoing employee a franchise, what became
known internally as ‘the golden handshake’. Indeed, FE7 recalled speciﬁc instances where an
internal franchise candidate was chosen ‘because we had another corporate person coming
up to take their (employee) role’. However, the prospect of receiving a franchise opportunity
was also used as a tool to motivate and ‘for rewarding and recognizing loyal and long
serving employees’ FE4. When asked if this approach was used by franchisors as
a motivational tool for some employees, FE9 who ultimately became a franchisee commented, ‘it always was for me, one hundred per cent’. Merely witnessing other employees
become franchisees also had a positive eﬀect. ‘From a motivational perspective I think it
was the greatest thing for someone in a corporate situation to see their boss get promoted
into becoming a franchisee’ FE9.
4.1.3. Larger unit scale
Systems that have a smaller scale at the unit level and therefore fewer employee managers,
tended to be less able to recruit internally. Commenting on their franchise system’s lack of
IRFs, FE6 observed:
. . . it is a scale related thing, because in our franchise model they (the franchisees) have a fairly
low level of staﬀ . . . so they are the managers, the franchisees. They have a lot of casual staﬀ
who by default do not work full-time and so do not have aspirations to go on and develop
a career in the business.
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Inherent in this quote is the system’s small scale at the individual unit level, which meant
franchisees usually acted as the unit managers themselves rather than employing managers, thus shrinking the pool for potential IRFs. This contrasted markedly with the much
larger unit scale of one international franchise chain that had over 500 Australian stores
and recruited IRFs extensively. According to FE3, the average store in this chain ‘has about
140 staﬀ, 15 managers and a store manager sitting at the top of the tree’. Further, FE4 who
has a 31-year history with this same chain observed, this chain had ‘no shortage of
employees at all levels wanting to become their own boss (franchisees)’.

4.1.4. Unit viability
Respondents indicated that franchise chains struggling for viability at the unit level ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to recruit internally. While external recruits were driven by return on investment,
internal recruits’ frame of reference was related to the company salary that they would
forego to become a franchisee. Thus for internal recruits, expected franchise unit viability
needed to match or exceed their corporate exit salary. In clarifying this point, FE4
pronounced that internal recruits needed to foresee the likelihood that they would earn
more as a franchisee, ‘even if they were earning just a bit more than what they had been
previously’.
Commenting on a number of their chain’s head oﬃce staﬀ who had recently decided
against acquiring a franchise due to lack of unit viability, respondent FE6 stated ‘to be
honest I think they would be looking at it and saying, in the current climate it is a lot of
work for little return’. Conversely, FE2 mentioned in regards to one large international
chain with an annual EBITDA proﬁt of A$800,000 per store, ‘it is not hard to ﬁnd someone
to go into just about any store in Australia now . . . they have got 80 people (employees) in
the oﬃce that want stores’. This point contrasted with the chain where FE2 was managing
director, which had ‘lots of franchisees working 60 hours a week for A$50,000 per
annum per annum take-home pay’ and was consequently struggling with recruiting
franchisees. Even though this franchise was a large international brand, it was ‘probably
dying a slow death’ FE2. Indeed, several respondents identiﬁed that for any franchise
system, proﬁtability at an individual unit level is a key overarching ingredient, not just
a requisite for IRFs. FE5 stating ‘I think any successful franchisor has, number one, got to
be committed to making their franchisees successful. I think that is the diﬀerence
between a good and bad franchisor’.
4.1.5. System maturity
Early in a system’s life cycle the opportunity for internal recruiting appears limited for
three reasons. Firstly, there are limited internal candidates to choose from as corporate
headcounts for chains in their infancy are typically small. Secondly, as observed by FE5
prior to their recruitment as a franchisee ‘in most cases IRFs have clocked up 15 years in
the system they were working in’, which precludes their early availability. Thirdly, in their
early years franchise systems are usually extremely reliant on the ﬁnancial capital provided by franchisees (Caves & Murphy, 1976). IRFs tend to have less capital when
compared with ERFs, ‘internally . . . there is a bit less capital because franchisors are not
the greatest of (salary) payors’ FE9.
Thus, franchise chains entering system adolescence may have an advantage in being
be able to sustain unit growth by utilising some of their experienced system employees to
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become IRFs. Indeed, commenting on the maturity of a chain which started in 2006 and
where they now hold a senior role, FE1 stated ‘I think these next 10 years are our (the
franchise system’s) teenage years’. Further, they saw such systems as being increasingly
reliant on some of their maturing pool of system employees becoming IRFs to facilitate
future growth. Indeed, regarding this chain’s prevalence of IRFs FE1 observed, ‘it is just
starting to happen, I think we started franchising to internal employees in the 10th year
about three years ago’.

4.1.6. Capital freedom
When contemplating why do organizations franchise, FE4 remarked ‘for a lot of new
brands . . . it’s because they do not have the capital, so they need the (franchisees) capital’.
FE2 observed, that particularly in the early years ‘franchisors want some people with good
equity and that is usually not an (internal) employee’. Chains that reach a unit count of
over 50 outlets are viewed as attaining a critical threshold where the need for franchisees’
capital reduces, ‘you have got this big gap . . . and these are the guys that do it really well,
they have best practice’ FE3. Indeed because they have greater access to ﬁnancial capital,
more established chains become less reliant on franchisee’s capital for growth (Oxenfeldt
& Kelly, 1969). Ostensibly, this provides the capital freedom to generate more creative
franchise structures that make it easier for internal recruits, who possess less ﬁnancial
capital, to acquire a franchise. Such established chains are often more focused on acquiring franchisee’s human capital as identiﬁed by agency theory, which suggests franchisees
will outperform company managers (Norton, 1988a; Rubin, 1978). Indeed, FE1 and FE7
cited the modiﬁcation of their franchise system’s standard franchise structure, was key to
facilitating the entry of numerous IRFs who had less capital than ERFs. This modiﬁed
arrangement allowed the franchisee ‘to put in less money and the franchisor shared more
of the proﬁt pie . . . because they were putting in more money’ FE1. Now involved at
a senior level with a subsequent chain, FE1 believes such schemes are so crucial in
fostering internal recruits and growth, they are encouraging their current chain to
develop a similar mechanism. This is particularly prescient as this chain now has over
10 years of operation, has just reached over 100 stores, and has recently receive a capital
injection from a private equity ﬁrm, thus it is primed for growth.
4.1.7. Strong growth in unit numbers
Unit numbers tend to increase the most on a percentage basis, in the early years of
operation of a franchise system. However on an absolute unit numbers basis, the greatest
growth often occurs some time beyond 10 years of operation. FE1 reﬂecting on the
evolution of a large chain where they had been managing director noted, that the zenith
of recruiting IRFs coincided with peak growth in store numbers. At that point, this chain
was adding ‘nearly one store a week’ FE1. From around year 15 to year 25 of its Australian
presence this chain more than doubled in size, ‘so we went through huge growth . . . and it
was (driven by) predominantly long serving employees becoming franchisees’ FE5.
During such times of high growth, a prevalent factor in recruiting IRFs appeared to be
expediency due to the overwhelming requirement to satisfy the system’s unit growth
objectives within the imposed time horizons. Expediency was expressed most often by
the mid-level interviewees (regional managers) who felt the direct pressure to meet
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growth targets dictated from management above. As a regional manager FE5 commented on the diﬃcultly of coordinating many conﬂicting demands:
that was very diﬃcult . . . you would have planning issues on one side . . . delays in terms of the
store development plan, equally on the other side you would have the (trainee) franchisee’s
own development, their level of proﬁciency, their level of capability . . . and you have
a candidate (external) potentially saying, well I do not want that store . . . so therefore
I needed to consider a company employee to ﬁll the gap.

The expediency provided by an IRF was directly related to them not needing the recruiting and training time required to on-board an external candidate, which could be up to
9 months duration. Furthermore, not all ERF candidates made it through the training
process with Bradach (1995) estimating that only ‘1% −2% of the people who made initial
inquiries were approved’ (p. 74). Consequently, the perceived ‘risk proﬁle became greater
with an external franchisee’ FE5. IRFs were perceived as signiﬁcantly less risky and
considered ‘ready to go’ (FE4). With ‘internal people for a franchise you have had
15 years to interview them and you really, really know what you are getting’ FE1. ‘It
takes away your risk by recruiting internally because you have already done your due
diligence on those people. You have sort of done the psychometric testing because you
have worked with them’ FE2. This was also consistent with Bordonaba-Juste and PoloRedondo’s (2008) ﬁndings on relationship duration, trust, and commitment in a franchise
setting.

4.2 Perceived impact of IRF on the four franchising strategic imperatives
The second research question explored what impact franchisors perceived IRFs had on
the franchise system achieving the four franchising strategic imperatives. The results
indicate IRFs are perceived to confer system advantages for unit growth and system
uniformity. Table 2 presents these results which are now expanded upon.

4.2.1. Unit growth
It was evident IRFs can have a positive impact on a franchising system achieving their
growth imperatives. For some chains, as evidenced by several respondent quotes
previously cited, IRFs represented a signiﬁcant additional source of qualiﬁed potential
franchisees. This was particularly apparent for chains that had: their own stores, signiﬁcant system hierarchy, scale at the unit level, unit viability, attained a level of system
maturity, and some capital freedom. Indeed, numerous interviewees outlined the
importance the capacity to recruit internally provided in meeting growth targets. The
vagaries of external franchisee recruitment did not always align with the unit growth
schedules imposed from top management. Consequently when timing became an issue,
Table 2. Perceived impact on the four franchising strategic imperatives.
Strategic Franchising Imperative
Growth
Uniformity
Local Responsiveness
Systemwide Adaption

Internally Recruited Franchisees
✓✓
✓✓

✓✓ = Strong positive relationship ✓ = Moderate positive relationship

Externally Recruited Franchisees

✓
✓✓

JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC MARKETING

13

the expediency provided by IRFs came to the forefront of the decision process, ‘to
attract people it is probably easier to recruit . . . internally . . . (IRFs are) always what I call
the emergency requirement” FE4. ‘In most cases of the internal people that ended up
with a store . . . it was because a situation arose, and we said who is the right individual
to ﬁll that hole for us’ FE7. When asked how often internal recruits ended up being the
fallback option to expedite growth targets, FE5 a regional manager responded, ‘that
happened a lot’.

4.2.2. System uniformity
All but one respondent acknowledged IRFs’ superiority delivering system uniformity and
achieving system standards. FE7 stated:
I tended to ﬁnd an internal person maintained the standards a lot higher because they had
been exposed to it a lot more . . . I found people who came from totally diﬀerent industries
(ERFs) . . . needed to be coaxed a lot more in that area to understand that this industry needed
those high standards.

FE4 saw IRF’s strengths in system uniformity and standards as ‘one of the reasons that
they are attractive to the franchisor’. In fact, most respondents acknowledged IRFs were
a superior option in respect to system uniformity:
the standards were always better from IRFs mostly because they just knew what to do and
often the people that came from internal were operations people, so the positive you had
with them was that they knew the standards, they could run great operations (FE2).

4.2.3. Local responsiveness
When it came to local responsiveness, two thirds of respondents believed IRFs were less
likely than ERFs to be truly responsive to local market demands. The other third perceived
there was little diﬀerence. According to FE5 ‘external franchisees were far more agile in
adjusting to local market conditions and more consumer aware. There was an inherent
robotic reliance on the system in the case of the internal franchisee. So, chalk and cheese
on that one’. While FE1 observed, as a franchisee:
you have got to understand . . . the community and the surrounds you operate in. An internally
recruited franchisee probably does not get that as much as an external one does . . . (ERFs)
would be a lot better in the community than the internal franchisees. They (ERFs) would . . . be
able to engage with the local community, local politicians, local charities in a way that most
internal franchisees during their employee career were really not that much exposed to.

4.2.4. System-wide adaption
A clear diﬀerence was evident between the franchise executives’ perceptions of IRFs
competencies in respect to system-wide adaption and generating new ideas and innovation. ERFs were perceived as far more adept than IRFs in generating new ideas and
innovations. As stated by FE4 ‘IRFs were more conservative . . . a lot of them only knew
what they knew . . . they were good at following the formula but then sometimes did not
cope well with change’. Further, as FE5 acknowledged in respect to system-wide
adaption:
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my experience was that the former company employees were a lot more restrained and a lot
more silent and stood back when it came to challenging the status quo . . . if there was a new
initiative, I think you would have external candidates driving it.

Consistently, ERFs were perceived as oﬀering more to franchise systems in situations
where ‘you are looking to innovate and think diﬀerently, and when you are facing
challenges that you cannot draw on your history to solve’ FE6. A point further elaborated
upon by FE5, ‘in terms of challenging the status quo, challenging the way we go to
market, challenging how the brand is represented, clearly external franchisees were so
much more talented than internal’.
As IRFs have accumulated many years of institutionalized thinking concentrating on
the organisational compliance and execution issues of the franchisor, their entrepreneurial and innovative skills were perceived as underdeveloped when compared with ERFs.
This view was encapsulated by FE7’s observation:
an internal person thought what they were taught was right . . . whereas an external person
would say, well why does it have to be that way . . . I can think of a diﬀerent way of doing it
that might achieve that faster or more economically. So, I think the external person (ERF) in
many cases came up with a lot of our ideas.

A view was expressed, that too high a proportion of internally recruited franchisees could
see a chain become incestuous, engage in groupthink and ultimately lack the business
diversity required for success. FE5 characterized this ‘as the gene pool that you bring to
the business, how diverse you are (ERFs) and how insular you are (IRFs)’. FE1 who started
with one chain at 15 and went on to become Managing Director stated, ‘I think the
internal person has been indoctrinated into the company, believes in the company,
probably does not question the company as much’. FE1 subsequently commented that
maintaining a proportion of ERFs was the preventive solution to this:
. . . questioning of the company’s decision-making was always a lot more forthright from external
people than it was from internal people . . . they had this demeanor about them (the ERFs), about
being absolutely frank . . . if you asked me who would tell you without mixing words exactly what
they thought about the company and the errors that we were making, it was the externals.

5. Discussion
This study’s results suggest the exploration of IRFs has been a worthwhile line of enquiry.
This deduction is perhaps not surprising given the origin of the topic was predicated on
the disparity between coverage of IRFs in industry publications, versus their noticeable
absence in academic literature.
The ﬁrst research question identiﬁed multiple drivers for a system’s propensity to
recruit franchisees internally which include the presence of company owned stores,
signiﬁcant system hierarchy, larger unit scale, unit viability, system maturity, capital freedom and strong unit growth in numbers. While these IRF drivers are preliminary, they
have never been identiﬁed in any previous research and warrant further examination.
Regarding the second research question which explored the perceived impact of IRFs
on the franchise system achieving the four franchising strategic imperatives, the internal
recruiting of franchisees appears to confer signiﬁcant advantages in achieving the unit
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growth imperative, particularly given the acknowledged industry scarcity of qualiﬁed
ERFs. The imperative for system uniformity also seems to be enhanced by IRFs.
However, IRFs are not as favorable as ERFs in respect to the imperatives of local responsiveness and system-wide adaption.
With reported rates of IRFs prevalent in some franchise systems within this study’s
sample approaching 50 per cent, IRFs provide a catalyst for a signiﬁcant new avenue of
franchising behaviour to be researched. In fact, this could mirror the extent of the impetus
provided to franchising studies by multiple unit franchising, from the mid-1990 s to the late
2000’s (Bradach, 1995; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996). Indeed, Weaven and Frazer’s (2007, p. 194)
observation that ‘the paucity of prior research concerned with multiple unit franchising
adoption appears at odds with this expansionary strategy’ may prove just as apt for IRFs.
The results of the current study strongly suggest IRFs provide one solution to franchisors’ resource scarcity needs, however rather than being for ﬁnancial capital it is for
human capital. IRFs appear to be consistent with, and predicated on agency theory in its
purest form, as it assumes that the same individual will provide superior performance
merely by changing their agency status from employee to franchisee. IRFs could be
considered an additional variant of the plural form, with plurality being manifested not
only by systems operating company-owned stores and franchise stores, but also with
another layer of pluralism provided when stores are franchised to IRFs or ERFs.

6. Managerial implications
From a practical point of view, given that a dearth of qualiﬁed franchisees has long plagued
franchisors and stymied their growth (Bailey, 2018; Bradach, 1997; Frazer et al., 2012, 2014),
this research provides important insights for franchisors who may decide to use IRFs as
a partial solution to their future franchisee recruitment needs. More extensive use of IRFs
could present a viable and eﬀective option to counteract the shrinking pool of available
franchisees (Bailey, 2018) however, the decision to do so should be viewed as a strategic
imperative and implemented on a considered basis. In this research the pursuit of IRFs
seemed to be somewhat ad hoc with the middle and lower level participants characterising
many IRF decisions as being tactically driven by short-term pressures to meet unit growth
numbers or organisational succession planning needs. Although some chains in this
research still attained around 50 per cent IRFs, this outcome appears to not be premeditated
but more the consequence of an emergent strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) resulting
from expediency. This suggests a more deliberate strategy to pursue IRFs as part of an
expansion plan should involve initially ensuring there is a suﬃcient employee pool to recruit
from. Accordingly, franchise organisations that currently do not operate company owned
units would need to alter their franchise structure to utilize a plural form (simultaneous use
of company owned and franchised units) since this structure results in a larger workforce
pool, providing a greater opportunity to recruit IRFs.
However simply having suﬃcient employees to recruit IRFs from is not the complete
solution. The current research also indicates a requirement for the development of
appropriate mechanisms for internal employees to make an eﬀective transition to
become franchisees. IRFs often lack the requisite ﬁnancial capital demanded of
a standard external franchisee applicant. Consequently in order to facilitate more IRFs,
franchise organisations may need to develop another tier to their franchise agreements
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requiring less capital upfront from the IRF. As a result the standard structure would still
exist primarily for ERFs, however an additional agreement structure primarily designed for
IRFs would be oﬀered requiring less capital but demanding a higher royalty. Such
a structure emulates the approach the largest chain covered by this research undertook
to overcome its IRF shortfall. The main caveat in the ﬁnancial design of this new structure
is that, to be compelling to IRFs it would need to retain the likelihood that the IRfs’ prior
employment salaries would be exceeded by their proﬁts as franchisees.

7. Theoretical implications and future research directions
Numerous theoretical implications stem from this research. Currently the overall propensity of franchise chains to recruit internally is unknown. The variation in the perceived
prevalence of IRFs between chains in this research (0 per cent to 50 per cent) suggests
a priority exists to establish the prevalence of IRFs within not only the fast food industry,
but the broader franchising community more generally.
The results of this research indicate that while IRFs confer advantages for unit growth
and system uniformity, they are viewed as less adept than ERFs regarding local responsiveness and system-wide adaption. This suggests that chains that rely too heavily on
either ERFs or IRFs may yield sub-optimal results in achieving the four strategic franchising
imperatives. Consequently, just as prior research on plural form chains has attempted to
formulate the optimal mix between company-owned units and franchise units
(Madanoglu, Castrogiovanni, & Kizildag, 2018; Vázquez, 2007), so too the optimal mix of
IRFs and ERFs within franchise systems needs investigation. Further, ERFs perceived
superiority in the strategic imperative of system-wide adaption may indicate that IRFs
and ERFs diﬀer with respect to entrepreneurial orientation (EO). That ERFs may be superior
in EO given they are perceived as more advanced in system-wide adaption. Dada and
Watson (2013) analysed the eﬀect of franchisor EO on franchise system performance
outcomes ﬁnding a reasonably strong correlation while, Chien (2014) found among other
things, that franchisee EO directly and positively aﬀected franchisee performance. Thus
any potential diﬀerence in EO between ERFs and IRFs and the implications this may have
for franchise performance warrants further investigation. IRFs perceived deﬁciency in local
responsiveness needs to be empirically tested by future research. If veriﬁed franchise
systems may need to address this deﬁciency by implementing local engagement training
programs for IRFs to mitigate this apparent shortcoming.
Finally, the establishment of a further category of franchisees in IRFs, presents implications
in terms of how to reconcile IRFs with the main theories in the domain of franchising research
of resource scarcity, agency theory and plural form symbiosis. While these implications are
beyond the scope of this exploratory study, they present a fertile ﬁeld for future research.

8. Limitations
As an exploratory study with a small purposively selected sample, this work has limitations
in terms of representativeness, reliability and generalisability (Saunders et al., 2009).
Consequently, a subsequent quantitative study incorporating a larger representative
sample should seek to validate this study’s results and preliminary model.
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9. Conclusion
This study aims to commence a dialogue on the internal recruiting of franchisees, which
although prevalent in some chains in today’s marketplace, remains an under researched
area of franchising. It is intended that future studies will build from the initial learnings of
this study to enhance the body of literature around this emerging franchisee recruitment
option. This exploratory research represents an important initial step in gaining insights
into the circumstances that inﬂuence franchisors to choose internal franchisee recruiting
arrangements and what diﬀerential outcomes they perceive this may provide in the areas
of unit growth, system uniformity, local responsiveness and system-wide adaption.
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